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Abstract This paper aims at gaining a better understand-
ing of the inherent paradoxes within sustainability dis-
courses by investigating its basic assumptions. Drawing on
a study of the metaphoric references operative in moral
language, we reveal the predominance of the ‘well-be-
ing = wealth’ construct, which may explain the dominance
of the ‘business case’ cognitive frame in sustainability
discourses (Hahn et al. in Acad Manag Rev 4015:18–42,
2015a). We incorporate economic well-being variables
within a philosophical model of becoming well (Ku¨pers in
Cult Organ 11(3):221–231, 2005), highlighting the way in
which these variables consistently articulate a combination
of ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ concerns. We then compare
this broad understanding of well-being with the metaphors
operative in the sustainable development discourse and
argue that the sustainability discourse has fallen prey to an
overemphasis on the ‘business case’. We proceed to draw
on Georges Bataille to challenge the predominance of these
value priorities and to explore which mindshifts are
required to develop a more comprehensive understanding
of what is needed to enable ‘sustainable development’.
Keywords Sustainable development  Well-being 
Metaphor  Georges Bataille
Introduction
In this paper, we investigate some basic assumptions
inherent in discourses around sustainable development in
order to better understand its current paradoxes and
impasses. Our analysis draws on Hahn et al.’s (2015a)
description of two distinct normative frames within sus-
tainable development discourses, i.e. the ‘business case
frame’ and the ‘paradoxical frame’. The ‘business case
frame’, which characterizes much of what is written in
corporate sustainability, pursues a ‘utility’-based instru-
mentalist and often short-term justification for integrating
social and environmental concerns within a firm’s business
operations. The ‘business case’ frame is, however, more
complex than is often acknowledged. Since profit-seeking
remains a central part of the rationale for sustainability,
many have become preoccupied with showing how social
and environmental efforts ‘pay-off’ (Painter-Morland and
ten Bos 2016). Others have argued that ‘legitimacy seek-
ing’ rationales are even more important to companies and
more helpful in implementing sustainability initiatives than
profit-seeking rationales (Schaltegger and Ho¨risch 2015).
Whether pursued for profit or legitimacy, the ‘business
case’ rationale has its limitations in terms of the pursuit of
sustainable development. ‘Corporate sustainability’ should
be distinguished from ‘sustainable development’. Examples
of arguments for ‘corporate sustainability’ abound. For
instance, Go´mez-Bezares et al. (2016) analysed the impact
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of CSR on market shares for FTSE 350 companies during
the period 2006–2012. The main finding of the paper is that
‘investing in companies with corporate sustainability not
only generates higher returns during peak phases, but also
diminishes shareholders’ losses during bear phases’. In
contrast to this strategy of corporate profit maximization or
financial risk management through sustainability strategies,
‘sustainable development’ is a normative concept outlining
desirable development paths in societies, with an interest in
ensuring intergenerational justice (Hahn et al. 2015b,
p. 298). This is especially important since the level of
analysis (societal–organizational–individual) and the time-
frames (short vs. long term) directly impact the motivation
for, and implementation of sustainability initiatives. Dif-
ferent levels of analysis and different time-frames often lead
to paradoxical tensions and contradictory impulses. We join
Hahn et al. (2015b) in arguing that sustainable development
can only be meaningfully addressed in corporations if the
paradoxical tensions and contradictions that lie inherent in
corporate sustainability are acknowledged. We will argue
that George Bataille’s political economy provides important
perspectives in doing so. In fact, we believe that he chal-
lenges us to fully articulate these contradictions.
To highlight the way in which the ‘business case’ frame
has become dominant in corporate sustainability discourses,
we will study some of the metaphors and reveal the
assumptions that they harbour. The study of metaphors in
organizational contexts is widely acknowledged as a valu-
able way to gauge the tacit belief structures operative in
organizations (Morgan 1980; Alvesson 1993; Milne et al.
2006; Cornelissen et al. 2008; Hart 2008; Audebrand
2010; Tay 2010). Studying metaphors in the area of sus-
tainable development helps us develop an understanding of
how certain moral conceptions come into existence, how
they are related to our real embodied experience of the world
(Johnson 2007), and how they now guide our thinking and
argumentation within sustainability discourses. We there-
fore aim to provide an analysis of both the cognitive–lin-
guistic dimensions of metaphor and the discursive
functioning of metaphors (Cornelissen et al. 2008).
Below we argue that the understanding of ‘well-being’
that the ‘business case’ draws on is too narrow, especially
within sustainability discourses that have to take into account
the complexities of people’s subjective desires. We will
consider the various definitions of well-being that have
emerged in the literature and show how they consistently
articulate a combination of ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’
concerns, long-term and short-term variables, and different
analytic foci (individual, group and systemic). We also draw
attention to the centrality of subjective well-being and its
relationship to individual autonomy and societal flourishing
in these definitions. When one compares the metaphors
operative in sustainability discourses with these conceptions
of ‘well-being’, an impoverished understanding of ‘well-
being’ is revealed. The metaphors used in sustainability
discourses implicitly assume the model of homo economicus,
the rational agent who directs his/her own course towards
well-being through rational calculative decision-making. In
fact, a kind of ‘moral accounting’ scheme often informs the
pursuit of sustainable business practices. In many cases, this
leads to a failure to adequately consider the implications of
particular business practices for ‘subjective well-being’,
which are crucial to support concerns for the environment
and social responsibility. Recognizing this over-reliance on
moral accounting may overcome some of the limitations of
our current approaches towards sustainability.
We would like to offer our reading of some of Georges
Bataille’s writing on political economy as a starting point
for thinking through these issues.1 We believe that some of
Bataille’s ideas on political economy offer important
insights on the relationship between what economist
describes as ‘objective need’ and ‘subjective desire’. In this
way, he might help us further unpack the paradoxes and
tensions that exit within Hahn et al.’s (2015a) ‘paradoxical’
framing of sustainable development. His ideas in this regard
challenge us to reconsider some of the basic assumptions
that inform our understanding of sustainable business
practices. Prima facie, Bataille’s vision on the economy may
lead to pessimistic conclusions with respect to calculative
sustainability, but, more importantly, it helps us understand
that the pursuing a sustainable economy is far more complex
than then the current common metaphors suggest.
Conceptions of ‘Well-Being’
Lakoff and Johnson (1999) draw on cognitive science
research to argue that one of the most basic cognitive
structures of our moral language is what they describe as
the ‘Well-being is wealth’ construct. Our basic bodily need
for well-being makes it inevitable that an increase in well-
being is defined as a gain, and any impediment to well-
being as a loss, or a cost. The system of moral accounting
that underlies our way of approaching moral questions is
quite intricate and shapes our expectations of each other.
Consider the following everyday phrases: we ‘invest’ in
relationships, or ‘profit’ from hard work. Lakoff and
Johnson (1999, Kindle edition Chapter 14 Location 7743)
1 Bataille was a French intellectual, who came to prominence in the
mid-twentieth century. He was close, among others, to prominent
philosophers such as Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Klossowski and Hyppo-
lite. Many of these scholars had a background in philosophy, as well
as a broad knowledge of the literature, social sciences, ethnology,
psychoanalysis, etc. In their writings, they brought all of this to bear
on some of the pressing ethical and politico-economic concerns of
their times.
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go further to argue that by that decreasing someone’s well-
being, one also incurs a certain moral debt, for instance you
owe someone an apology for an insult. Much in the way
that economic transactions depend on financial bookkeep-
ing, we implicitly rely on moral bookkeeping. This ‘moral
bookkeeping’ system demands some form of reciprocation,
i.e. the possibility of retribution or revenge, or restitution or
reparation. It should therefore come as no surprise that it is
very difficult for us to get beyond calculative thinking
when it comes to morality, as is also evident in the ‘busi-
ness case’ cognitive frame (Hahn et al. 2015a). The ‘right’
thing to do is to increase well-being, and the ‘wrong’ thing
to do is to diminish it. A reliance on some notion of ‘moral
accounting’ informs our acceptance of moral arguments
regarding the acceptability of ‘trickle-down economics’ or
beliefs in the power of the ‘invisible hand’. As long as
something works to increase well-being/wealth, it is
morally acceptable. In what follows, we offer an analysis
of various conceptions of ‘well-being’ to better understand
what is perceived as ‘wealth’. More specifically, we bring
economic conceptions of well-being in conversation with a
philosophical understanding of being well, combining
subjective and objective, and individual and collective
dimensions (Ku¨pers 2005).
What we found is that a materialistic bias initially
seems to have informed the exploration of the ‘well-
being = wealth’ cognitive frame. It led researchers to
focus on the analysis of the relationship between mate-
rialism and well-being, anticipating the existence of a
positive relationship between those two variables. In the
economic literature, the term ‘happiness’ has historically
been used as a synonym for ‘welfare’ and ‘well-being’.
Happiness is defined as social welfare, a concept much
broader than just economic well-being (Abramovitz
1959). Easterlin’s (1974) main result is that in developed
countries people reported levels of happiness that did not
significantly correlate with GDP. This is referred to as
the ‘Easterlin Paradox’, i.e. well-being does not increase
with an increase in monetary wealth, and has been found
to exist in various international contexts (Blanchflower
and Oswald 2008).
Indeed, well-being measures even appear to be nega-
tively related to consumerism and overconsumption
(Christopher et al. 2009; Miesen 2009; Burroughs and
Rindfleisch 2002). From a social perspective, it is widely
acknowledged that overconsumption has a negative impact
on social welfare and it is unsustainable. Indeed, it depletes
resources at higher rates, causes the accumulation of waste
on landfills and generates pollution during the production
stage. Therefore, even if beneficial in the short term (higher
production leads to higher employment rates), it is counter-
productive in the long term, generating intergenerational
justice issues as well.
A lot of research has been devoted to studying the
impact of different variables on well-being (Graham 2008;
Graham et al. 2004; DeNeve and Oswald 2012). Some
studies compare conceptions of ‘well-being’ in different
national contexts. These studies have found a remarkable
degree of convergence in the variables that different
national populations associate with ‘well-being’ (Chuluun
et al. 2014). These variables include health, income,
employment, stable partnerships and social relationships.
Interestingly, income is considered important only up to a
certain threshold (Chuluun et al. 2014). When individual
income is extremely low, it tends to have a negative impact
on people’s well-being. Consequently, a rise in income
only improves the well-being of individuals with a low
level of income.
In simple terms, people only enjoy a sense of well-being
if they have food security, are free from persecution and
have a safety net to fall back on (Dolan and Metcalfe
2012). Graham (2008) argues that the main variable
affecting people’s happiness is their own health and not
their individual income. Indeed, respondents reported well-
being is affected by expectations of their own health and
the correlation between happiness and health is more sta-
tistically robust than that between happiness and income.
According to Sen (1999): ‘the fulfillment of these needs
help provide people with the capabilities to flourish as
human beings’. As such, the satisfaction of certain ‘ob-
jective needs’, which is related to having the basic means
of livelihood and good health (which are often related), has
always been a core component of ‘well-being’. However,
after income reaches a certain threshold, further increases
in personal income do not increase well-being, but other
variables start playing a significant role. For example, an
individual’s income relative to those of others starts to have
an important impact on his/her sense of well-being (Chu-
luun et al. 2014). Burroughs and Rindfleisch’s (2002) main
finding is consistent with the social welfare view, where
individuals who internalize social values more than indi-
vidual materialistic ones enjoy a higher well-being. On a
similar note, Vansteenkiste et al. (2006) show that sub-
jective well-being is positively related to social values and
relationships, while materialism and its different forms
(wealth, possessions) has no impact on it.
The idea that well-being includes ‘subjective’ and non-
monetary variables has gained widespread consensus
(Graham and Nikolova 2013; Diener 2012). According to
Graham (2010), an advantage of using ‘subjective’ mea-
sures of well-being is that respondents can have their
voices heard by expressing their personal opinions. Frey
and Stutzer’s (2002) main finding is that self-reported
satisfaction depends heavily on non-monetary variables,
such as social capital and good governance. Ryan and Sapp
(2007) explain that: ‘subjective well-being concerns a
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person’s capacity for optimal functioning, a confidence in
being able to formulate and act to fulfil important goals and
the motivation and energy to persist in the face of obsta-
cles’. Cognitive evaluations of one’s life, happiness, sat-
isfaction, positive emotions such as joy and pride, and
negative emotions such as pain and worry all form part of
one’s experience of ‘subjective’ well-being. Stiglitz et al.
(2009) have therefore proposed that each of these ‘sub-
jective’ variables should be measured separately to derive a
more comprehensive appreciation of people’s lives.
This discussion echoes earlier philosophical discussions
related to the methodological assumptions of economic
theory and the broader utilitarianism debate. Within eco-
nomics, utility is typically defined as the degree of satis-
faction of preferences, and the latter are considered as
given data (the preferences as they are ‘revealed’ in the
choices of sovereign consumers), that do not deserve any
further discussion. The title of a famous article of George
Stigler and Gary Becker, defending this methodological
assumption, is unsurprisingly ‘De Gustibus Non Est Dis-
putandum’ (Stigler and Becker 1977).2
However, Griffin (1991) has argued that, although this
simplification may make sense for explanatory of predic-
tive purposes, it misses the point as a concept of well-
being. According to Griffin, well-being is the fulfilment of
‘informed desires’, not of whimsical preferences. That
means the subjective preferences should not only be
rational in a formal sense (which means that an ordering of
preferences should be complete, transitive, etc.) but also in
a broader sense: they have to be understandable as valu-
able. That means that we have to be able to understand the
preferences against the background of general human aims
(Griffin 1986, p. 51). The economist’s way of considering
preferences starts from the idea of ‘consumer sovereignty’,
according to which things are valued because they are
desired. A normative approach of rational preferences
necessarily has to reject this ‘taste-model’ (Griffin 1991).
People have preferences for one option over another
because on the basis of an independent valuation of these
options. It starts from the idea that things are desired
because they are valued by the subjects, and our values are
not purely capricious or a mere matter of taste. Among the
authors who, like Griffin (1991), defend the latter position
we can further distinguish between authors who defend the
idea that what people value is ‘subjective’ and authors who
claim that there is an ‘objective list’ of elements that
people should value. In other words, there is an ongoing
philosophical debate about how well-being should be
conceived that is not clarified at all. But, as van der Deijl
(2017) has recently convincingly demonstrated, this
disagreement among philosophers about how well-being
should be conceived does, surprisingly, allow to some
extent the measurement of well-being. This is related to the
fact that philosophers and social scientists—who try to
measure well-being—despite their conceptual disagree-
ments, agree on some general principles about well-being:
for example, there is an agreement about the principle that
well-being is subject-dependent: roughly, what is good for
someone’s life depends on what the person values. And
secondly, they all agree there is an epistemic limitation:
people are not always the best sources to judge their own
well-being. The acceptance of these principles allows us to
make some sense of the measurement of well-being,
despite underlying disagreements on well-being as a
philosophical concept (van der Deijl 2017).
In order to assess what people actually value, Summers
and Smith (2014) draw on the Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment (MEA 2005). They include the following
variables in their assessment of ‘subjective’ well-being:
choice, solastalgia (distress caused by environmental
change around one’s home), community vitality, access to
nature, affection/respect towards nature, cultural require-
ments, happiness, freedom, topophilia/sense of place,
identity, social cohesion, access to diverse nature, access to
leisure, aesthetics. There is a strong emphasis in this list on
a sense of agency, as well as persistence and coherence
over time. As Dolan and Metcalfe (2012) emphasize,
agency, social norms, virtues and behaviours can either
determine subjective well-being or be generated as a result.
Therefore, in order to correctly evaluate the policy impli-
cations of subjective well-being, the direction of the
causality process plays a central role. It is of outmost rel-
evance to be able to understand the various dimensions of
subjective well-being, in terms of behaviours and social
norms, because ‘from the perspective of subjective well-
being, agency, social norms, virtues and individual beha-
viour are only important in so far as they have the ability to
change the experiences of people’s lives’ (Dolan and
Metcalfe 2012).
As Hahn et al. (2015b) indicate, one must take account
of the different levels of analysis and time dimensions if
one wants to understand sustainability. We believe that this
categorization offers a helpful starting point to better
understand the well-being dimensions that may tacitly
influence our sustainability discourses. Hahn et al.’s
(2015b, p. 301) analysis highlights the importance of
acknowledging various levels of analysis (societal, orga-
nizational, individual), time dimensions (long vs. short
term), etc. If we were to plot the various variables that we
discussed above based on the typical level of analysis that
is at stake, and time dimensions that are in play, the
paradoxes would become clear. For example, where does
one place ‘income’ on the short-term or long-term axis?
2 For an excellent overview and clarification of the confusions around
utility and well-being in economic theory, see Hausman (2012).
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Where would ‘loneliness’ fall on the axis that depicts
individual, social or systemic concern? The purpose of
such an analysis would be to show how important it is to
acknowledge that these different analytical foci lead to
often paradoxical tensions when it comes to understanding
not only sustainability, as Hahn et al. argue (2015a), but
also well-being = wealth, which is a core cognitive frame
that shapes moral discourses.
In his philosophical exploration of well-being, Ku¨pers
(2005, p. 226) acknowledges this complexity and proposes
a more inclusive, practice-oriented approach that would
allow us to investigate the complex, interrelated processes
involved in understanding well-being. Ku¨pers describes
these processes as ‘the integral pheno-practice of well-be-
ing’. ‘Pheno’ refers to phenomenological approach that
aims to describe how subjects experience and make sense
of their ‘Lebenswelt’. His proposal of analysing the inte-
gral pheno-practice of well-being draws on advanced
phenomenology that views subjective, intersubjective and
objective dimensions as part of a process of interrelational
becoming well, which unfolds over time and displays many
paradoxical tensions.
The process character of becoming well may help us
understand why short-term and long-term, individual and
social dimensions have to be included in any understanding
of well-being. Graham (2012) categorization of hedonic
well-being, which represents ‘how people assess their daily
experiences’, would be categorized as short term, and their
descriptions of ‘evaluative well-being’, which represents
‘how people assess their lives as a whole’, would be long
term. The former is extremely specific, and in surveys, it is
analysed with the use of questions about positive and
negative things that respondents experience in their lives,
whereas the latter is assessed with the use of questions
related to life satisfaction as a whole. In order to assess
hedonic well-being, respondents are requested to provide
information about ‘the emotional quality of their everyday
experience’, that is to say ‘the frequency and intensity of
experiences of joy, stress, sadness, anger, and affection that
make one’s life pleasant or unpleasant’ (Kahneman and
Deaton 2010). On the other hand, in order to assess lives as
a whole, respondents are asked about the ‘thoughts they
have about their life when they think about it’ (Kahneman
and Deaton 2010). Evaluative well-being incorporates a
measure of eudamonia, i.e.: ‘how much purpose there is in
people’s lives’. Income and education are good predictors
of life satisfaction, whereas health, care giving, loneliness
and smoking better predict daily emotions (Chuluun et al.
2014). Empirical evidence shows that evaluative well-be-
ing matters more for individuals with more means and
agency, and the reverse is true for hedonic well-being
(Graham and Nikolova 2013). Ku¨pers (2005, p. 222) also
investigates on the distinction between hedonism and
eudaimonism and comes to the conclusion that subjective
hedonic and social and eudaimonic dimensions both con-
tribute to our understanding of well-being as an unfolding
interrelational process.
In Fig. 1, we use Ku¨pers’ model of ‘becoming well’ as
an integral pheno-practice to map the multiple well-being
variables that emerge from economists’ analysis of well-
being.
What becomes clear is that ‘well-being’ can be descri-
bed as a combination of ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ vari-
ables that can only be understood by using different levels
of analysis. The dominance of variables in the ‘culture’
quadrant is of particular interest. We will now investigate
how the various dimensions of well-being are reflected in
sustainability discourses in order to unpack the ways in
which strictly objectivist calculative thinking cover over
the inherent paradoxes within sustainability discourses. We
then explore how a Bataillian analysis may help us
understand the interaction between well-being variables
that operate across quadrants.
Sustainable Development Metaphors
Metaphors and Valuation
If ‘sustainable development’ is to be defined in the way the
Brundtland report has done, i.e. as meeting our current
needs without compromising the ability of future genera-
tions to meet their needs (WCED 1987), then the way in
which ‘needs’ are conceptualized is key to imagining
sustainable business strategies. One can only develop an
understanding of ‘needs’ that is related to our conceptions
of well-being, if the tacit normative parameters that
underpin it can be revealed. The idea goes back to at least
Nietzsche: our understanding of the world is mediated by
language, and metaphors are an important linguistic tool
that plays an immense role in the way in which we ‘con-
struct’ reality, and also morally desirable realities. How-
ever, as Nietzsche pointed out, metaphors live their own
way and people become unaware of the fact that they are
metaphors in the first place, like ‘used coins’ on which the
face of the king they represent is no longer visible (Niet-
zsche 1886/1973). Metaphors reveal some aspects of real-
ity (that is why they use them), but they hide at the same
time perspectives that other metaphors could have
revealed. Insofar as we are mostly unaware of the
metaphorical character or our use of language, we are
likely to forget that our way of thinking and our way of
seeing things is largely perspectival. Many scholars in
organization studies have explored the fundamental role, be
it constructive or ambiguous, of metaphors in management
(Cornelissen et al. 2008). An important distinction around
Sustainable Development and Well-Being: A Philosophical Challenge
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the analytic form that metaphors take is the difference
between a contextual, cognitive–linguistic approach to
metaphors and a contextual, or ‘discourse’-based approach
to metaphors (Cornelissen et al. 2008, p. 9).
The first approach considers, in the way in which we
presented Nietzsche’s reflections on metaphors above,
metaphors as tools of thought that organize our experience,
as ‘patterns of thinking’ that appear in different contexts,
that structure our perspective on reality in a way we are
largely unaware of. The second approach examines how
specific metaphors are used in specific contexts and ‘ac-
tively employed to ‘manage’ interests in social interaction’
(Cornelissen et al. p. 13). Both approaches are not neces-
sarily mutually exclusive, but the perspective is different.
The first approach suggests a metaphorical mapping of the
mind in which we are trapped and the second a manipu-
lative use of metaphors to defend interests. The way in
which metaphors crop up in the sustainability discourse
suggests that both approaches are relevant.
Well-Being 5 Wealth as a Root Metaphor
When we looked at the metaphors operative in sustainability
discourses, we highlighted well-being = wealth as a dom-
inant cognitive–linguistic root metaphor, which is linked to
a whole range of other metaphors used in existing
contextual discourses, which may elicit, or foreclose certain
insights around sustainability. From the cognitive–linguistic
perspective, the metaphors within the corporate sustain-
ability discourse help us understand certain cognitive pro-
clivities around well-being and wealth. This is important
since well-being = wealth, as a ‘root’ metaphor, informs
our most basic forms of understanding and as such helps us
gauge what is considered to be of value and how this is
measured and pursued. Audebrand (2010) defines root
metaphors as follows: ‘Root metaphors make up the ulti-
mate presuppositions or frames of reference for discourse on
the world or a domain within it’. Corporate sustainability’s
calculative mindset persists because of the existence of root
metaphors of which the content has become distorted. In the
case of the ‘business case for sustainability’, corporate
sustainability perpetuates the implicit understanding that
wealth has to be understood as monetary wealth.
Natural Capital
Within the corporate sustainability discourse, one of the
most dominant contextually operative discursive metaphors
is that of ‘natural capital’. With this metaphor comes a
range of other assumptions. The ‘root metaphor’ that the
notion of ‘natural capital’ draws on is related to the cog-
nitive–linguistic structure that well-being = wealth:
Fig. 1 Economic well-being
variables from the perspective
of a pheno-practice of becoming
well. [Authors’ own, adapted
from Ku¨pers (2005)]
M. Painter-Morland et al.
123
capital can be stored, built up through investment, used
instrumentally, or it can be depleted, or lost. It therefore
needs to be measured, managed and manipulated through
instrumental procedures and rationales. From a discursive
perspective, the metaphor ‘natural capital’ was proposed
with the best intensions, i.e. as a ‘boundary object’ to
create common ground between diverse actors and assert
the importance of the protection of the environment as a
non-negotiable condition for flourishing. However, if it
covers over certain cognitive prejudices, such as that well-
being is related to monetary wealth, it can also become a
hegemonic concept (Akerman 2005, p. 45). It can surrep-
titiously serve to entrench calculative practices and calcu-
lative agency and, in doing so, make it harder to think
about the environment in any other terms (Blewitt 2005,
p. 72).3
When one looks at the cognitive assumptions that
‘natural capital’ make, and relate it to the root metaphor of
well-being = wealth, the notion of ‘natural capital’ seems
to gloss over the real differences between financial capital
and natural capital. It has been proposed that this danger
could be obviated by refining the use of related metaphors.
Gough (2005, p. 97), for instance, argues that the
exploratory power of the metaphor of ‘natural capital’ is in
tension with its explanatory power. Financial stock’s value
is at any given time (t) taken to be the net present value of
the total flow of benefits as at t, plus the benefits which it is
expected to provide in future, minus the costs (the corre-
sponding value of any present or future costs) associated
with maintaining the stock in being. But ‘natural capital’
does not operate in the same way, largely because the
relevant present knowledge may be irreducibly incomplete
and the degree of uncertainly of the value is dramatically
higher than in the case of the stock market (Gough 2005,
p. 98). Gough (2005, p. 99) goes on to argue that
employing the notion of ‘real options’ as a sub-metaphor to
deal with ‘natural capital’ makes much more sense because
it can accommodate this uncertainty and complexity. In
sustainability marketing, reference is sometimes made to
the ‘living product’. This also represents an attempt to deal
with the uncertainty of dynamic and flexible natural con-
figurations (Mitchell and Saren 2008). In our view, these
mitigation strategies are ultimately still subject to an
implicit calculative scheme of ‘moral accounting’. It does
little more than acknowledge the inherent complexity
involved in such calculative endeavours.
In her analysis, Akerman (2005, p. 38) proposes that the
‘natural capital’ metaphor influences the rules according to
which claims about sustainable development can be made,
as well as the way in which the objects of environmental
knowledge are constituted. The notion of ‘natural capital’
evokes two very different images of nature, i.e. as a
financial asset and as an ecosystem. However, the former
of these images, with its implicit link to monetization, has
gradually begun to predominate. As a result, the meaning
of the concept of ‘natural capital’ has narrowed within the
field of corporate sustainability. It has come to denote a
kind of ‘productive machinery’ (Akerman 2005, p. 46). In
its wake, various calculative practices based on the pre-
sumption of biophysical and monetary competition have
emerged. The dominance of this calculative thinking has
essentially marginalized other ways of expressing the
relationship between humans and nature (Akerman 2005,
p. 48).
Industrial Ecology
The ascendence of calculative thinking in the field of
corporate sustainability is also associated with the intro-
duction of another metaphor: ‘industrial ecology’ (Hess
2010). The precise relation between biological ecosystems
and industry is, of course, far from unambiguous. Hess
(2010, p. 271) therefore argues that it is important to dis-
tinguish between the ecosystem as a model and the
ecosystem as a metaphor. Understood as a model, an
ecosystem’s various underlying representations are simply
not all amenable to transposition. For instance, the circular
way in which one agent’s waste serves as another’s
resource within natural ecosystems does not necessarily
correspond to industrial systems’ linear model of manu-
facturing, consuming, storing, or discarding. Hess (2010,
p. 274) argues furthermore that regularity, abundance, and
diversity are not necessarily properties of industrial sym-
biosis, nor of companies, which are after all not natural
organisms. By drawing attention to the significantly dif-
ferent implications of understanding ‘industrial ecology’ as
either a metaphor or a model, Hess encourages a more
considered employment of this, and other metaphors within
the field of sustainable development. Valuable as this may
be, it does not really seem to have the power to propel our
discourses beyond the gravitational pull of calculative
thinking.
The ascendence of calculative thinking is evident in the
predominance of utilitarian arguments in the moral justi-
fication of business behaviour. The oft-touted ‘business
case for CSR’, which is an instance of ‘corporate’ or
‘weak’ sustainability, is a familiar case in point. In a
similar vein, corporate philanthropy is advocated as a way
of creating ‘moral capital’ for the firm. This has led to an
attempt to rationalize philanthropy as a form of ‘enlight-
ened self-interest’. This is done by means of tying phi-
lanthropy directly to strategy, or by embedding
philanthropic activities more explicitly within a defined
3 And even in these calculative terms, the metaphor seems to be
misappropriated, as Winnett (2005, p. 87) convincingly argues.
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CSR strategy. The paradoxical effect of this is that the
more firms become ‘socially responsible’, the more the
discretionary scope of philanthropy is limited (Spence and
Thompson 2009, p. 373). Within the realm of ‘strategic
philanthropy’, there is also an intense preoccupation with
measurement technologies. The result is that whatever
cannot be measured and reported on is deemed valueless.
Corporations also extract surplus value from their partici-
pation in philanthropic activities and mine the emotional
commitment of various stakeholders to particular causes to
help build their brands (Spence and Thompson 2009,
p. 385). All of this may be taken as indications of the extent
to which an insidious kind of ‘moral accounting’ has
become normalized within business communities in recent
times.
There is an implicit conflation between monetary wealth
and moral wealth in this kind of instrumental reasoning. It
provokes moral contempt for any perceived form of waste,
as this entails a loss of wealth and well-being. Furthermore,
it creates intolerance for anything that cannot be justified in
instrumental financial terms. Spence and Thompson
(2009), for instance, have drawn attention to some of the
moral impasses thrown up by business’ ‘pathological
profit-seeking’ and unwillingness to contribute to anything
unless it yields some sort of business benefit. They point
out how justifications for so-called corporate philanthropy
are inevitably predicated on the notion of ‘the deserving
poor’. The fact that charities have to prove that their con-
stituencies ‘deserve’ corporate largesse is clearly incoher-
ent and inappropriate within the context of ‘altruistic’
giving. Similar paradoxes may be observed within the field
of sustainable development. Banerjee (2008a, p. 58), for
instance, argues that the efficiency–legitimacy dichotomy
within corporate sustainability discourse often becomes
problematic because legitimacy is subordinate to
efficiency.
What effectively happens is that ‘notions of legitimacy
are discursively produced and defined by economic effi-
ciency criteria’ (ibid.). It seems therefore that a preoccu-
pation with effective growth of wealth, especially in terms
of private property, has come to shape contemporary atti-
tudes towards sustainable development. However, given
some of the problematic implications associated with this
approach, the time may have come to reconsider some of
the assumptions that inform our understanding of sustain-
able development.
A critical reassessment of the tacit ‘well-being equals
wealth’ construct that seems to inform so much contem-
porary thinking about sustainable development is a good
place to start. The equation of well-being with wealth is
problematic in both directions: on the one hand, the per-
vasive preoccupation with calculability that shapes our
language tends to preclude other possible conceptions of
well-being. On the other hand, the use of ecological
metaphors obscures the differences between flourishing, as
it is experienced within the context of the non-human
world, and the accumulation of financial wealth. In fact,
associating industrial ecology with natural ecology, and
financial capital with natural capital, may serve only to
perpetuate misconceptions about the true objectives of
business activity. The problem seems to lie on two levels:
(1) the calculative mentality that pervades contemporary
thinking about sustainable development and (2) the fact
that calculations are almost exclusively performed in
pecuniary terms, and more likely to focus on the individual,
rather than collective level.
However, these problems are ultimately no more than
the inevitable implications of a much more basic set of
common assumptions regarding the nature of human
agency. In many business communities, ‘homo economi-
cus’ remains an implicit and largely unchallenged ortho-
doxy. If human beings are, as subscribers to this orthodoxy
suppose, essentially rational, calculative and self-interested
individuals, whose actions follow from careful considera-
tion of their own economic interests, then it stands to
reason that they should employ rational, financial calcula-
tion in their approach to sustainable development. How-
ever, this account of human agency largely ignores
experienced forms of ‘subjective well-being’ that may
influence the perceptions and behaviour of individuals and
groups. It cannot meaningfully accommodate the interac-
tion between subjective and objective and individual and
collective well-being variables. It also underscores the
assumptions inherent in the discursive employment of
metaphors.
The Journey Metaphor
A prominent metaphor that has been deployed within
current sustainability discourses is the ‘journey’ metaphor,
which is an excellent example of the discursive approach to
metaphor. Milne et al. (2006) start from the observation
that in the debate about sustainability we can easily dis-
tinguish between scholars—and business people—who
defend ‘weak sustainability’, that is the idea that sustain-
ability will be realized through incremental improvements
in which business will explore eco-efficiency and ulti-
mately find win–win strategies that combine sustainability
with profitability, and other scholars who argue that sus-
tainability can only be reached on the basis of a far more
radical change of our economic and social system.
According to the latter, an incremental approach is hope-
lessly insufficient to reach sustainability: we have to end
growth in human (demographic) and economic terms.
Milne et al. (2006) observe that the surprisingly frequent
use of the metaphor ‘journey’ to characterize the transition
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towards sustainability allows to weaken the tension
between short incremental business initiatives and the
radical requirements of a sustainable human civilization on
earth. They illustrate how the use of this metaphor (by
business people and international organizations in partic-
ular) reassures society insofar as it suggests many things at
the same time and equally hides some other aspects.
‘Journey’ suggests that we are on our way, that there is a
commitment, and it assumes implicitly that economic
development and the planetary constraints can be recon-
ciled at some point. It simplifies the picture and, in fact,
distracts our attention from the real decisions that should
be made right now. The authors judge the journey meta-
phor as dangerous insofar that insufficient changes will be
made. However, although the ambiguous role of the
metaphor is convincingly demonstrated, the authors argue
merely that it conveniently allows business people avoid-
ing fundamental discussions that would question the
legitimacy of their business activities, but they do not
explicitly argue that business people have actively
been using this metaphor to legitimize continuing business
as usual. The metaphor plays an ideological role, but no
ideology creator is identified. At most, we could conclude
that the paper makes an implicit ‘cui bono’ conspiracy
argument: business people unconsciously perpetuate cer-
tain root metaphors that fit in with their financial interests,
especially since these are hardly ever challenged.
Audebrand (2010) proposes that we should, from the
perspective of strategic management, consciously search
for powerful metaphors, that is, metaphors with a high
heuristic value that will lead to creativity and innovation.
On the other hand, Audebrand argues, we should stop using
metaphors, like the prevailing ‘war’ metaphor, that narrow
our mindset and that do not allow integrating sustainability
in strategic management. In a similar vein, we believe that
Bataille can be helpful in understanding why certain
metaphors, as cognitive–linguistic structures, as well as the
discursive use of metaphors towards certain purposes, fail
to help us to further meaningful sustainable actions. We
believe that some assumptions that current metaphors make
around well-being = wealth misinterpret what human
beings really value and how we become well. With Ku¨pers
(2005, p. 228), we argue that well-being is not something
that individuals ‘have’, but that instead emerges out of the
communal interplay and interchange between individuals,
communities and their environments. In what follows
therefore, we begin to explore a conception of human
agency that does not require us to deny or gloss over the
complexities of subjective, interrelational experience. We
offer this conception of ‘non-calculative sovereignty’ as an
alternative to homo economicus’ calculative autonomy.
We believe that its capacity to include, rather than exclude
the important role of subjective experience in human
behaviour ultimately makes it a more appropriate concep-
tual basis for thinking about sustainable development.
Reconsidering the ‘Well-Being Equals Wealth’
Equation
Bataille’s Political Economy as Challenge
to Conceptions of Utility
Although Bataille himself considered his work as an
economist (in La notion de de´pense, and La part Maudite)
as his most important work, it has never been taken seri-
ously by economists (with one exception4). This is easy to
understand if one considers the radically different view-
point Bataille develops. Jean Baudrillard succinctly
observed that Bataille ‘attacked the metaphysical principle
of the economy’ (Baudrillard 2010, p. 149). Bataille did so
by posing a fundamental challenge to the scope of the
concept of ‘utility’. The conception of the market economy
that informs most contemporary textbooks is based on the
assumption that economic agents (be they consumers,
producers, employers, employees, etc.) are rational utility
maximizers. Such agents maximize the satisfaction of their
preferences by weighing up alternative choices, cutting
costs, optimizing output with given input, maximizing
profit, permanently calculating and optimizing against
given parameters or against the changing strategies of
competitors in a complex market environment. Moreover,
these rational agents save and invest, i.e. they optimize in a
context of risk and uncertainty, which implies that they
always focus on the future. In Bataille’s description of
capitalism, he draws attention to its participants’ pervasive
obsession with ‘utility’ (in the more narrow sense of
‘usefulness’). The logic that follows from this obsession
dictates that spending should be limited to useful things
that will contribute to future benefits. Although this is not
Bataille’s wording, we believe that the well-be-
ing = wealth metaphor is implicit in the mainstream way
of conceiving the economy, or in Bataille’s vocabulary, the
‘restrictive’ economy.
From Bataille’s perspective, most people have come to
see the capitalist economy as the pursuit of well-being
through wealth (materialistically defined), both in theory
and in practice. However, there is, according to Bataille,
another not really hidden, but rarely recognized dimension
to the economy. A narrow focus on the rational maxi-
mization of utility obscures what Bataille sees as the real
sources of human motivation and well-being, much of
which we could situate at the interface of the consciousness
4 The exception is Francois Perroux. See Guillaume (1987) for a
discussion of the reception of Bataille as an economist.
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and culture quadrants of Fig. 1 (Cf. supra). Bataille studied
anthropology and was aware of the fact that even in archaic
civilizations the economy produced much more than peo-
ple actually needed to survive. This surplus production
allowed the ‘sacrificial expenditure’ of resources-including
human labour and lives. Surplus resources were often
consciously depleted, destroyed, consumed, wasted or
squandered without any consideration of utility. One may
of course argue that this only occurred in primitive
economies like the ones described by anthropologists like
Malinowki or by the Jesuits who described the Aztec cul-
ture, but not in the contemporary capitalist system. And
indeed, Bataille argued that the typical bourgeois in the
capitalist economy is characterized by what he calls a
‘servile’ attitude: all decisions are considered in terms of
future benefits. Everything is carefully calculated and
optimized. However, what ultimately really mattered in
primitive economies were precisely those moments when
calculation, anticipation of the future and considerations of
utility played no part in shaping the behaviour of groups or
individuals. Bataille insisted that this is also true of our
own time, though it may be harder to recognize or admit.
Little wonder that he gave the title ‘Au-dela` de l’utile’,
(beyond usefulness) to a draft version of ‘The Accursed
Share’—the book in which he developed these ideas.
Bataille sees this transgression of what he calls the ‘utility
constraint’ as something positive. For him, it is a liberation
from servility. He therefore uses the metaphor, ‘sover-
eignty’ to describe it. For him, there is something almost
miraculous and sacred in this disregard of utilitarian con-
straints. Like a king, people act sometimes as if they were
beyond calculation and servility. In this sense, the discur-
sive employment of Bataille’s description of ‘sovereignty’
redefines the root metaphor of well-being = wealth,
embracing ‘wealth’ from a general perspective. This would
involve a sense of detachment from the cost cutting, opti-
mizing and calculating utility-maximizing attitude of the
homo economicus.
The self-avowed objective of Bataille’s theoretical
project is a general critique of the ideas that subordinate
human activities to aims different from the useless con-
summation (sometimes erroneously translated as con-
sumption5) of their resources. He wants to destroy those
ways of seeing that justify ‘servile forms’ (our translation,
Bataille’s italics 1976, p. 10). We should note here that the
French word that we translate as ‘consummation’ has the
connotation (according to Larousse) of ‘the action of
destroying something, progressively or totally, like by fire’.
So, the point is not necessarily to consume in a hedonistic
way (although hedonism is not systematically absent, even
in Bataille’s examples); it is rather that the expenditure or
the destruction of the resource serves no further purpose. It
is in that sense that it is a sovereign ‘consummatory’ act. It
has a kind of ‘intrinsic’ value—a value in, and of, itself. It
neither requires nor submits to utilitarian justification. For
Bataille (1976, p. 11), a system in which everything is
compelled to submit to the tyranny of utilitarian calcula-
tion, and nothing is ‘sovereign’, is ultimately absurd.
Bataille (1991) therefore criticizes bourgeois power’s
preoccupation with scarcity, productivity, frugality and
instrumentality/utility. This concern with utility in capi-
talist bourgeois societies found a powerful partner in
Christianity’s advocacy of hard work and frugality (Taylor
2004, p. 316). Bataille argues that capitalism’s unrelenting
utilitarian imperatives effectively forced human beings into
servility. The frivolous, useless and dangerous were grad-
ually marginalized and ostracized. A convergence of eco-
nomic, social, legal and moral power was required to create
and sustain this system. Bataille draws our attention to
some of the latent tensions in contemporary capitalist
societies: male bourgeoisie regularly transgress their own
calculative edicts in acts of war and luxurious expenditure.
For Bataille, these are essentially consummatory acts of
sovereignty. In turning to a prostitute, for instance, the
bourgeois man turns to something beyond the systems of
usefulness. He luxuriates in a kind of wasteful expenditure,
which is an act of consummatory sovereignty inasmuch as
it serves no purpose beyond itself. The widespread fasci-
nation with the figure of the criminal (consider here the
plethora of popular TV shows focused on crime) may also
be attributable to its apparent wanton destruction and
wasteful expenditure of property and lives. Similarly, the
wars of the twentieth century are instances of catastrophic
expenditure, which followed the excessive growth and
expansion brought about by industrial capitalism. In
Dorfman’s (2002, p. 38) reading of Bataille, ‘Our fantasies,
silences and immoralities are products of the limited nature
of the real, the articulated and the moral’.
Bataille’s Relevance to Sustainability Debate
Maybe the easiest way to catch the starting point of
Bataille’s vision on the economy consists of taking a look
at the monthly supplement of the Financial Times with the
unapologetic title ‘How to spend it’ (http://howtospendit.ft.
com). In this supplement, you find advertisements for
extravagantly expensive watches, yachts, fabulous vacation
resorts, private jets, etc. These pages are particularly
addressed to people who spend their working day inventing
cost-cutting measures, arbitrage on financial markets,
investing, optimizing and managing. That is, perfectly
‘servile’ activities. And yet, these people seem fascinated
by the idea of spending huge resources just for fun. Bataille
5 Sometimes Bataille defines consummation as unproductive con-
sumptions. Cf. Bataille (1976: 12).
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(1976, pp. 248–253) offers a number of other examples of
‘sovereign’ behaviours. He describes driving around in a
car, for instance, on what he calls a ‘contemplative jour-
ney’. This may be strange nowadays but one has to imagine
what it meant in the 1950s to drive around in the French
countryside in an act of ‘contemplation’. This activity is
completely unrelated to the conventional ‘use’ or ‘useful-
ness’ of a car. It is not directed towards the future. Instead
it is an act of complete presence in the moment without a
defined aim (Bataille 1976, p. 253). For Bataille, ‘sover-
eignty’ is fundamental to being human: to feel free to do or
refrain from doing whatever one likes/dislikes, to be
completely absorbed in one’s experience of a moment, to
remain unperturbed by any particular aim or concern for
the future (Bataille 2011, pp. 181–182).6
Bataille’s distinction between a ‘general’ and a ‘re-
strictive’ economy is helpful in understanding our preoc-
cupation with pecuniary calculation. The ‘restrictive
economy’ focuses on the scarcity of resources within a
particular system and as such supports the conventional
model of rational, utilitarian exchange between profit-
maximizing economic agents. Bataille’s alternative notion
of a ‘general economy’, however, focuses on the excess of
energy (wealth) within a broader economic system. As
such, the general economy also encompasses those
resources that are available for sovereign consummation
within an economic system, including the social, the sexual
or the sacred. From this ‘general’ perspective, we may
understand ‘poverty’ as the inability to ‘consummate’ the
resources that are produced in the economy, rather than the
inability of the economy to produce enough resources for
‘consumption’ (Bataille 1991, p. 39). Bataille’s analysis
allows us to recognize that the widespread corporate
aversion to waste is informed by a ‘restrictive’ economic
perspective. From this perspective, the corporation’s agents
feel compelled to make productive use of what they per-
ceive as ‘scarce resources’, in order to benefit the corpo-
ration and its immediate stakeholders. The scarcity motive
enhances and perpetuates the calculative impulse, which
operates in the ‘business case’ for sustainability. It man-
dates that investments always yield measurable financial
benefits. It compels individual and corporate actors to
rationalize their actions by means of careful cost–benefit
analysis.
Typically, the ‘business case for sustainable develop-
ment’ has to be made convincingly before corporations are
prepared to commit themselves to it. Corporations want to
see how social investments will translate back into finan-
cial gain, which, in turn, can be re-employed in the pursuit
of further profit (Margolis and Walsh 2003). The implicit
goal in all of this seems to be to avoid ‘waste’.
However, paradoxically, much of the preoccupation
with reinvesting the surplus of labour into further growth
seems to yield, on the level of the ‘general economy’, even
more wasteful consumption of useless goods. As Rehn and
O’Doherty (2007) point out, our contemporary lives are
characterized by an endless array of unnecessary products
and services. This proliferation of the excessive is indeed
the complete opposite of the frugal ‘economization’ of
costs, marginal utility and economic rationality (Rehn and
O’Doherty 2007, p. 99). In the case of the middle and
working class, their ‘waste’ emerges from a desire to
become well amidst the complex interplay of individual,
collective and systemic dynamics, which make no clear
sense from a rational perspective. The fact that this
expenditure is ‘useless’ is precisely the point. It is, as Zwier
et al. (2015) describe, a kind of pressure valve, which
allows the transformation of energy into growth to con-
tinue. Without this excessive release or expenditure, either
catastrophically or gloriously, the system cannot continue.
What would it mean to approach sustainable develop-
ment from the perspective of the ‘general economy’? It
amounts to a move away from scarcity and frugality to the
acceptance of excess and ‘waste’ as an inevitable part of
human society. Though ‘waste’ and ‘expenditure’ are
related, there is also a possibility of considering certain
types of expenditures as ‘glorious’, rather than catas-
trophic. Within the context of sustainable development,
global interdependencies and growing need, excess may
flow towards ‘objective’ need, but it also becomes avail-
able for the ‘sovereign’ consummation of ‘subjective’
desires, which allows for glorious expenditure on arts,
cultural festivals and science for its own sake, rather than
for utility (Zwier et al. 2015, p. 371). Sorensen (2012,
p. 180) points out that Bataille’s analysis of ‘sovereignty’
contains ‘an irreducible and principled opposition between
the ‘objective’ needs of the human being as such and the
‘subjective’ desire for sovereignty’. For Bataille, it is
important to recognize the important role of this subjective
desire in our economic activities. Bataille’s admonitions in
this regard may be more important ever as we collectively
endeavour to shift towards a more sustainable general
economy. He, however, allows us to go beyond criticism to
a fundamental assessment of the paradoxes involved in
being human.
Bataille’s distinction between ‘objective’ need and
‘subjective’ desire may help us redefine our understanding
of ‘well-being’ and, by extension, ‘wealth’. Some
researchers have calculated that there would be ample
resources to feed and clothe every human being globally, if
only the wealthier strata of global populations were willing
to forsake certain luxury commodities such as perfume,
alcohol and branded designer clothing. This seems to
represent a clear-cut, rational case for an alteration of6 Cf the comments of Sorensen (2012: 180-1).
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certain consumer behaviour. If people are essentially
rational, calculating agents, why do they remain so unaf-
fected by this kind of ‘objective’ calculative logic? The
answer is surely that calculations of ‘objective’ need do not
give us insight into, or control over, ‘subjective’ human
desire.
In Bataille’s political economy, we find an argument for
moving away from a calculative economic logic towards an
appreciation of the important role of ‘subjective well-be-
ing’ in our economic behaviour. From Bataille’s perspec-
tive, human beings’ tacit desire for ‘sovereignty’
inadvertently compels them to venture beyond the con-
straints of the calculable, controllable and predictable. As
such, ‘subjective’ desire may hold the key to an alternative
conception of ‘wealth’ and, by implication, ‘well-being’.
The question, however, remains, how can ‘sovereignty’,
i.e. the squandering of energy and resources on unpro-
ductive and useless activities be reconciled with responsi-
ble stewardship of our planet’s finite resources?
Of course Bataille, like almost all people at that time,
assumed unlimited amounts of resources and energy and
had no ecological concerns (Cf. Stoekl 2007, p. 39). Prima
facie, Bataille’s ideas about purposeless consummation of
resources seem at the opposite of sustainable development.
But the underlying sense of expenditure is sovereignty, the
need to satisfy subjective desire: doing things for their own
sake and not in a calculative way, for reasons of future
profit. In Bataille’s view, the energy delivered by the sun to
biological beings is unlimited. Plants develop in an exu-
berant way. Animals sometimes expend more energy than
they strictly need to survive. In human animals, this excess
of energy ultimately ends up in pure expenditure that
Bataille qualifies as a ‘consciousness of nothing’, which
raises self-consciousness to a higher level (Bataille 1991:
p. 190). The possibility of depleting energy (which does
not mean oil or something similar, but rather time and
effort) to ‘nothing’ is ultimately liberating (Geerts et al.
2014). Within contemporary capitalist societies though,
‘subjective’ desire has come to revolve around the con-
sumption of commodities, but it doesn’t need to be like
this. Stoekl (2007, p. 58) clearly distinguishes Bataille’s
expenditure from the consumerist utopia. Expenditure is
not about justifying the use 80 million barrels a day of oil,
but accepting the ‘wastage’ of human effort and time.
The subjective desire of sovereignty is also present in
the social, playful and creative parts of people’s lives.
Could we perhaps discard the notion of ‘homo economicus’
in favour of ‘homo ecologicus’? That is to say, mankind as
‘playful’ living organisms instead of mankind as rational
economic agents (Nodoushani 1999, p. 335). The point is
not so much about destroying resources, but about being,
like a sovereign, beyond calculation. Gift-giving is just
another possibility of a sovereign detached attitude towards
resources. Bataille explicitly mentions Marcel Mauss’s
famous essay: ‘The Gift. The form and reason for exchange
in archaic societies’ as a major influence in the writing of
his economic texts.7
In his interpretation of Bataille’s contribution to sus-
tainability discourses, Stoekl (2007, p. 50) also seems to
believe that an embrace of the general economy may
indeed serve the sustainability agenda, but not through
frugality, restraint or calculation of costs.8 Instead, Bataille
foresees a society that is sustained precisely because of the
human collectivity’s capacity for excessive and transgres-
sive expenditure, in which individual energy becomes part
of larger energy flows. His vision helps us envisage a world
where we cease to rely on fossil fuels and other storable
energy resources and instead rely on the sun’s excessive
energies and communities’ ability to share it. Zwier et al.
(2015) even argue that a sustainability strategy like the bio-
based economy will only succeed if it gives up on the
scarcity model that underpins it and embraces the pressure
valves of glorious expenditures.9
‘Energy’ is another way of thinking about the ownership
of wealth. In a restrictive economy, it is something to be
extracted, stored, used, recycled, always ‘productively’.
But this comes at a cost to society, both in cultural and in
systemic terms, which is often unacknowledged. Baner-
jee’s (2011, pp. 325–326) critique of ‘management by
extraction’, ‘management by exclusion’ and ‘management
by expulsion’ serves to illustrate what is at stake here:
when certain natural resources are extracted and bound-
aries drawn around them, the free flow of energy is dis-
rupted and blocked. For instance, when forests are treated
as if they are no more than carbon sinks, their broader
significance for local populations—not only as sources of
food, livelihood, sources of medicine, housing, but also of
culture, society, polity and economy—becomes obscured
(Banerjee 2011, p. 326). In other cases, indigenous popu-
lations are displaced to make space for infrastructure and
energy projects like dams. These forms of ‘containment’
disrupt the flow of energy as wealth within a general
economy. More importantly, such restrictive perspectives
on energy and the practices that follow in its wake destroy
7 Cf. The first lines of ‘The notion of expenditure’.
8 Cf. Stoekl (2007, p. 122) discussion of Lisa Newton’s position.
9 One reviewer suggested that offering a ‘non-calculative sover-
eignty’ as an alternative to homo economicus is itself a strategic
‘proto-calculative’ move. That is indeed the case, to the extent that
the concern for sustainable development is unavoidably future
oriented. However, the move consists in arguing that narrow
calculative profit-seeking (restrictive economy) without a sovereign,
detached attitude (that leaves room for subjective desire and a broader
sense of ‘well-being’) is not only denying a fundamental aspect of the
general economy, it is doomed to fail because the incremental
changes it allows seem hopelessly insufficient.
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our capacity to live in harmony with nature. If dimensions
such as topophilia and solastalgia are important dimensions
of well-being, we can see that such actions clearly under-
mine well-being, but not in a way that is completely cal-
culable. A case in point is the way in which capitalist
discourses around private property destroyed native popu-
lations’ intimate relationship to the environment (Banerjee
2003). In such instance, the utility of the action is privi-
leged, and the subjective desires, which lie in the interface
of the individual and the cultural, are ignored.
Bataille (1991, p. 31) argues that the ‘utility’ of certain
social practices (he for instance discusses lavish gift-giving
practices in ancient culture) cannot be calculated, because
the criteria by which they are judged are those of social
‘acceptability’. From the perspective of the general econ-
omy, some resources must be consummated for people to
experience a sense of sovereignty and social stability. In
the process, energy seems ‘wasted’, yet subjective desires
are fulfilled. We could therefore argue that instead of
narrowly reducing ‘development’ to capital growth, it
could be opened up to encompass phenomena such as the
emergence of a new social structure, the solidification of
existing social relations and the protection of beautiful
spaces.10 The goal of these practices is to facilitate the
flows of energy and resources within a society, which
forms part of the ecosystem, rather than standing outside or
against it. The criteria for sustainability projects then relate
to their capacity to allow for the forms of cooperation,
sharing, and energy circulation. Such practices may seem
‘wasteful’ from a utility point of view, yet they do not
deplete energy sources, whether these sources be human,
organic or inorganic. In addition, they fulfil certain
important subjective desires.
The point of this paper is to illustrate that much of what
we do in the area of sustainability may not be productive in
terms of monetary outputs and growth. From the perspec-
tive proposed by Bataille (1991, p. 31), sustainability is not
ultimately a question of ‘utility’, but one of ‘acceptability’,
both in terms of how it facilitates social relationships and in
terms of how it facilitates sovereign consummations. Fol-
lowing Bataille’s logic, one could argue that sustainability
emerges when social concern, economic concern and the
harmony of the natural biosphere are equally essential in
broadening our understanding of ‘development’. As such,
pursuing ‘sustainable development’, rather than just ‘cor-
porate sustainability’, will require a much more complex
analysis of the paradoxes inherent in sustainability. Placing
some forms of concern in the service of the calculative
rationality of the other makes this impossible. Bataille
makes a strong argument that one should approach the
problems we face within political economy from the per-
spective of the ‘general economy’, because the ‘particular’
perspective is always trapped within perceptions of a lack
of resources. He illustrates this in terms of the specific
problem of poverty (Bataille 2011, p. 65ff). The inequali-
ties in the world make it evident that some nations are in
need of exudation, whereas others are in need of growth.
Excess should therefore be directed to where growth is
needed as a non-reciprocal exudation, a oozing forth that
expects no return. The problem, however, is that as long as
scarcity exist, at least in the mindset of the ‘restrictive’
economy, the scheme of ‘moral accounting’ will be in
place and the question: ‘What can we expect in return?’
will inevitably be posed. There is such a preoccupation
with ploughing all excess back into new opportunities for
growth that the prospect of non-reciprocal expenditure
does not present itself as defensible option. Reinserting a
concern for social harmony means grappling with the
incalculable. The paradoxes inherent in pursuing both
individual autonomy and social relationships, both short-
term choice/freedom and long-term respect for nature,
defies categorization. It challenges the ‘utility’ that our
systems of moral accounting rely on. But if we take it
seriously enough, it might make exudation, the oozing
forth and the fulfilment of subjective desire possible
again—even if, and precisely because—there is no finan-
cial benefit associated with it. It would also allow us to
integrate the hedonic (the pleasurable), with eudaimonic
(the meaningful) as mutually reinforcing aspects of
becoming well (Ku¨pers 2005, p. 229).
Conclusion
Where does this leave us? Firstly, understanding the moral
metaphors that inform our normative arguments within the
business realm helps us gain insight into our most basic
assumptions, both from a cognitive perspective and from a
discursive perspective. However, simply understanding the
limitations of these basic orientations is unlikely to lead to
change. As Clarke et al. (2014, p. 248) point out, though
metaphors have great heuristic value, they also become
obstacles to greater understanding if mindlessly promul-
gated in theory. In order to rethink our approach to sus-
tainable development, new perspectives are necessary, and
alternative ways of living must be considered as viable
options. It is in this regard that Bataille and critical man-
agement scholars like Banerjee (2003, 2008a) are helpful in
reminding us that a different orientation to well-being is
indeed possible and crucial to consider if one wants to
10 There is a link to be made between this broader vision on
sustainability, beyond scarcity, and the recent debate about the role of
‘the commons’ in the economy. Leaving parts of the resources as
‘commons’ liberates us from short-term calculative profit seeking.
Ostrom (1990) is maybe the better known reference. But see Dardot
and Laval (2014) for a more radical view.
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provide a better account of the paradoxes inherent in pur-
suing sustainability.
If we could redefine ‘well-being = wealth’ as ‘well-
being = sovereignty = flourishing’, new possibilities in
terms of understanding sustainable development may
emerge. Some radical mind shifts may, however, be nec-
essary. ‘Wealth’, for instance, would have to be redefined
as opportunities for sovereign consummation, rather than
the sum total of what we extract, contain and monetize, i.e.
the resources we accumulate for consumption. Most
importantly, we need to widen our perspective beyond the
restrictive calculative logic that characterizes our thinking.
This has an impact on our linguistic employment of
metaphor and argument when it comes to sustainability. As
Bataille (1991, p. 30) explains: ‘life suffocates within
limits that are too close’. What seems to be needed is the
re-establishment of energy flows, beyond narrow interests
of calculating economic agents or nation states.
New connections with others that challenge mainstream
interpretations of wealth are therefore necessary. Baner-
jee’s (2011, p. 330) proposal that we engage in ‘translocal
resistance’ may be a step in the right direction. ‘Translo-
cality’ refers to ‘the multiplicity of local spaces and actors
and their interrelationships in a global world’. Translocal
spaces may help us to create new spaces of agency and
overcome the preoccupation with the interests of the nation
state and the vested (corporate) interests of many national
governments. State and market forces tend to focus on the
protection of individual rights at the expense of communal
rights. Banerjee alludes to the notion of ‘translocal sover-
eignty’, but this concept has yet to be developed theoreti-
cally and politically. Our redefinition of wealth calls for
translocal consummations and sharing of resources freely,
outside of the scarcity motives of the restrictive economy.
This would mean that resources, like energy, could be
exuded in whichever direction it is needed. Through a
glorious expenditure of energy, we move closer to the
integral pheno-practice of well-being that Ku¨pers (2005)
describes. It is a not something that one individual or firm
‘possesses’, but instead a process of becoming-well as
individual, cultural and systemic variables interact over
time.
Recognizing the important role of ‘subjective desire’ in
human motivation allows us to think about CSR as a
sovereign act that requires no reciprocity, yet must meet
the standard of acceptability from a translocal perspective,
taking into consideration the interaction between individ-
ual, cultural and systemic variables that play in role in
peoples’ ‘becoming-well’ (Ku¨pers 2005). This more
inclusive relational ethics may go a long way towards
addressing the objection that corporate sustainability is
more geared towards sustaining capital growth within
corporations than enabling the energy flows of people and
ecosystems. It may also help us to move beyond the kind
self-serving, calculative CSR that tends to support only
those stakeholders who have monetary power or some
other power to affect corporate interest. It could change the
way we talk about and approach sustainable development:
the emphasis would shift towards social acceptability, or
recognizing and exploiting opportunities for non-utilitarian
sovereign consummation in the way we relate to one
another and the non-human world. Ultimately, sustainable
development should be motivated by a concern for flour-
ishing and less preoccupied with the ‘business case’.
There is an urgent need to focus on protecting ‘living
matter’ (fauna, flora and ecosystems), rather than ‘dead
matter’ (capital and commodities) (Banerjee 2006). Ban-
erjee (2008b, p. 1543) sketches a dismal picture of what he
calls ‘necrocapitalism’: ‘practices of organizational accu-
mulation that involve violence, dispossession, and death’.
One way to reframe our conception of ‘wealth’ as the
accumulation of commodities for consumption is therefore
to draw attention to the way in which living, thriving things
are rendered lifeless in this process of commodification.
The interaction, over time, of the various quadrants of well-
being variables (as highlighted in Fig. 1) allows us to
understand the emergence of ‘subjective’ desires and to
allow for expenditures that are essential to any kind of
sustainable development. Instead of merely criticizing
capitalism for its current form, our challenge is to reframe
our thinking in more positive ways and to help find our
more social and subjective desires to find expression.
It may be unlikely that we can escape the ‘moral
accounting’ that underpins so much of our moral reasoning,
but we can at least attempt to rethink its terms. From our
analysis of the metaphors employed within the sustainable
development arena, such as ‘natural capital’ and ‘industrial
ecology’, it seems that we have allowed the ‘dead matter’
of capital to replace a concern for the ‘living matter’ of
nature/ecology in all of our equations, even if this had not
been the original intention. As such, our ‘moral account-
ing’ no longer serves to protect what is living. The para-
doxical effect of such calculations is that it undermines
what it seeks to protect. Alternatives to ‘moral accounting’
could only become possible if we (1) acknowledge peo-
ple’s aspiration to sovereignty, i.e. their ‘subjective’ desire
as a very important part of people’s sense of well-being and
wealth and (2) take a general rather than a restrictive view
of the economy.
Advocacy for sustainable business practices is often
based on the implicit assumption that those involved are
principally motivated by financial self-interest. Following
Bataille, we challenged this assumption. We propose
instead that, apart from securing the basic resources nec-
essary to sustain life, human beings are motivated by a
‘subjective’ desire for sovereign consummation. That is to
M. Painter-Morland et al.
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say, to act in ways that are not determined by considera-
tions of utility, efficiency or productivity. While such
considerations may be necessary to provide and secure the
basic resources necessary to sustain life, it is ultimately
opportunities for sovereign consummation that makes life
feel worth living. It is our contention that the importance of
the former is regularly absolutized, while the latter is
under-emphasized. Why should this be ignored as a motive
in our efforts to create more sustainable business practices?
People’s ‘subjective’ desires are routinely used to sell them
commodities that they do not need and that cannot be
justified on rational, calculative grounds. Why should these
desires not be brought to bear on our relationship with non-
human nature? In fact, we would argue that this happens all
the time. Why else would people decide to save a forest for
the sake of preserving an endangered species of diminutive
frogs—thereby willingly foregoing the considerably rev-
enue that could potentially have been generated from the
sale of timber or the produce cultivated on cleared land?
The world’s first nature reserve—Yellow Stone—in the
USA was created simply because those involved found the
landscape beautiful and wanted it to remain unspoilt. There
has perhaps never been a time or a place where pragmatic,
utilitarian values have predominated more than the nine-
teenth century, western USA. If such an act of sovereign
consummation can be undertaken in a context as unpre-
possessing as that, why should we doubt the power or
efficacy of the deeply human impulse behind it? Every year
hundreds of people attempt to scale Everest—the highest
mountain in the world. Many of them will spend their life
savings to do so. A small number will succeed. One in ten
will die in the attempt. And when you ask them why they
would spend and risk so much simply for the sake of
standing on top of a mountain for a few minutes, most will
simply echo the words of Edmond Hillary, the first man to
conquer Everest: ‘Because it’s there’. Because, in truth, it
makes no sense from a rational, calculative, utilitarian
point of view. Like so many of the things that make us feel
most truly alive, it is an act of pure, sovereign
consummation.
So perhaps we should try bringing people to the
mountain. Show them the pristine natural landscape with
its clear lakes, towering old-growth forest and teaming
meadows. Then show them the jumble of profitable toxic
reservoirs, blackened smokestacks and piles of broken
debris that could replace it. Give them an opportunity to do
something that makes no practical sense.
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